Introduction
In his 1959 article 'Restitution in Context', Stewart Macaulay reviewed a casebook on restitution and wondered whether the subject could be considered by itself, outside of the far broader context in which restitution cases usually arise. Thus began a long career of considering legal phenomena within their broader settings: without context, one might well lose nuance essential to understanding a subject. * Many thanks go to Alice Abreu, Rick Greenstein, Greg Mandel and Amy Sinden for their comments on an earlier draft and to the late John Kidwell for his extensive support and editing help with earlier drafts. The author also thanks Temple University for research support. norm' that may animate the behaviour of those who make and perform contracts. When used as a starting point in a normative instrumental analysis of the problem, the reciprocity norm can produce outcomes at odds with a conventional parallel analysis that does not take that norm into account. Section III will situate this problem within a different context: contract doctrine itself. R3RUE regards the losing contract problem as having a 'contract solution' and proceeds to define that solution using a particular vision of contract law. This conception is sharply distinguished from the broad idea of restitution that otherwise animates R3RUE, and this particular vision takes scant account of the reciprocity that is endemic to all but a narrow range of contracts. Section III will conclude by showing that this particular vision of contract law contributes strongly to the solution to the losing contract problem found in R3RUE and that a different vision, one that takes greater account of reciprocity, may well account for the different treatment given to the same problem in the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
Having suggested that our views about contract law may have changed during the 30 years between these restatement projects and that those views may well contribute to the different solutions to the same problem that we find in those two Restatement projects, we come to the uneasy conclusion in Section III that the 'right' solution as a normative matter may depend on how one looks at the problem and, in particular, on the extent to which we believe that the reciprocity norm is an important one in contract law.
Finally, Section IV will consider how the new rule might be received in the world of the courts as well as whether it might have effects outside the litigation system. Here it will be suggested that the rule may actually operate differently from the rule supported by most of the supporting commentary in R3RUE. This will result in substantial uncertainty that could in turn have the unintended effect (if it has any effects at all) of motivating the parties to modify their ongoing contracts rather than face the uncertainties of litigation. In this respect, the 'success' of the new rule will be in the eye of the beholder. traditional rule, as set out in Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 373, permits the plaintiff who has made a losing contract to recover from the breacher the reasonable value of the benefits conferred on the breacher without regard to the bargain loss implicit in the original bargain. 6 The rule was controversial when the Restatement was drafted, 7 but the ALI elected then to follow the majority rule in the case law. While the case law had not changed appreciably in the interim, 8 R3RUE changed this rule 9 to one where the losing party will always absorb in a damages award some of the loss on the original bargain.
Though there was scant support for change in the case law, the change was consistent with newly-dominant scholarly commentary supporting some form of reversal of the rule. 10 But it remains to be seen whether the change is a sound one as a matter of policy and, perhaps more practically, whether courts, mired in context as they usually are, will recognize it. While its latest incarnation is in the Restatement (Third) of Restitution, the losing contract rule raises questions that lie near the core of contract law and offers an opportunity to consider the methodology and underlying assumptions we bring to thinking about contracts.
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The easiest way to dig into the question is through a simple problem. Suppose
Dimwitted Contractor contracts to build Owner a house for the price of $150,000.
Whether desperate for work in the recession, overly optimistic about his own costs, or is $200,000 and it will cost the contractor that much to do the work. Owner knows she drove a hard bargain and is getting a great deal (a $200,000 job for $150,000 or a gain of $50,000). Even better from owner's perspective, she has negotiated a payment schedule that requires her to pay half the price ($75,000) when the job is 80 per cent complete and the other half when it is completed. When Contractor has done precisely 80 per cent of work (at a cost of $160,000), Owner refuses to pay anything at all and ejects him from the job, asserting a substantial breach by Contractor as the reason. This act, in fact, constitutes Owner's substantial breach of the contract and we can assume a court would so hold. How should we measure the contractor's recovery?
This question has puzzled courts and commentators for more than a century. Were we to award the contractor's 'expectation damages', we would put the contractor into the position he would have been in if the contract were fully performed. 12 In an 80 per cent completed contract like this, it would mean we would award the amount the owner did not pay, $150,000 minus the contractor's 'loss avoided' ($40,000), or $110,000 13 for the $160,000 worth of work completed. 14 An 'expectation damages' award would preserve the integrity of the original bargain, since the contractor should be seen as having bargained at the outset to lose $50,000 if he completed the entire job. One who asserted the sanctity and primacy of the contract that was negotiated would take this approach.
An alternative way of looking at it is to consider the owner's substantial breach to be the equivalent of the end of the bargain. Why, one might ask, should a breacher be effectively entitled to her profit when she induced the contractor's work by making her own promise but then did not then earn her own profit by fully performing the contract?
Promises were, of course, exchanged. But in a contract setting, the promisor did not make a promise 'to' herself but made it 'to' another person in the context of a bargain. Each promise was conditional on, and made in anticipation of-in reliance on-actually receiving what the other side promised. Indeed, a fair reading in nearly any case is that the parties were bargaining for the performances the promises represented, not simply for the substitutional relief value that a later trier of fact might place on the promises; an award of expectation damages is but one of many ways to measure that loss of the anticipated superior to (that is, more efficient than) any general rule developed by the legal system.
The parties' knowledge of and desire to avoid the government-imposed default rule would encourage them to develop a more efficient, individualized solution.
Because this kind of instrumental analysis is so easily manipulated, it is ultimately indeterminate as a normative matter. However, even if it were less indeterminate, abstract instrumental analysis begs the question whether it can offer much guidance at all in this complex setting. Unlike those provided by, say, a tax rule (for example, charitable contributions are deductible), the incentives imagined here are required to operate within highly-variable, unique, rich relational contexts where even if the incentives were accurately imagined, they compete with other incentives operating on the parties, such as the contractor's concern for business reputation, the availability of other options for the owner, the delay occasioned by a breakdown in the contract and so on. 32 Moreover, the analysis ignores the substantial transaction costs of the litigation alternative, as well as the potential for consequential damages, and assumes that the expectancy will be 'the same' whether it is delivered through a profitable performance by the losing contractor or through contract damages awarded to the winning owner in the win or lose litigation.
Such assumptions are, of course, extremely unrealistic. The relational forces one can expect to operate in this context, and the transaction costs of litigation (not to mention the other unrecoverable losses implicated in a failed contract) may well dwarf other values that might be in play and, if taken into account, suggest that, whatever the rule, it may have little effect on the behaviour of the parties within the troubled contract. 33 Except where the bargain is very large and extremely unbalanced in the winner's favour, the 'winner' will likely be economically better off with (and motivated towards) a successful negotiation regardless of the rule.
But even if one downplays the substantial noise produced by the complicated set of forces operating on the parties when a relational contract is in trouble, the incentives produced within that context by the current losing contract rule might well generate collaborative rather than self-interested responses. If the incentives produced by the losing contract rule work differently than imagined, the acontextual analysis that proceeds from it (whatever it may be worth) may be faulty.
At the core of the 'noise-free' normative economic analysis described is the implicit empirical assertion that people actually behave in the way the abstract model
assumes. An implication is that reform through a different (more efficient) rule will prompt people to behave differently (and, one must assume, more efficiently achieving efficient results in the real world, then we ought to get more valid prescriptions from an analysis that is better grounded in actual human behaviour. Actual human behaviour is, obviously, responsive to context; it will respond to whatever incentives the losing contract rule actually provides within the context of relatively long-term, relational contracts. Those contracts tend to be personal, unique and complex, on the other end of the contractual spectrum from swaps and other contracts that are only about shifting risks.
While one must be extremely sceptical that any rule will have real incentive effects on the parties within this context, a slight variation in initial assumptions tends to press in favour of the 'reasonable value rule'. Consider a different contractor stuck in the same losing contract, but this time with just a little more context added in. Once this contractor discovered he was operating at a loss, he might approach the owner to begin a If one imagined that the contractor's first move would be to approach the owner for a concession, rather than cutting corners, simply walking away, or strategically inducing the owner into breaching, then perhaps the situation would call for a rule that would encourage a collaborative adjustment of the losing contract in order to avoid its collapse. This would, at minimum, avoid the deadweight costs of non-consensual, These traditional rules create a downside for each of the parties should the litigation go the wrong way for them, a corresponding upside if the litigation goes right, and substantial uncertainty about which it will eventually be. Because of the uncertainty implicit in these rules, both parties will be motivated to reach a modification in order to avoid a breakdown of the contract and the hard-to-consensually-resolve dispute that will 34 See, eg I Macneil, 'Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky ' (1982) where in the performance the contract broke down. In this hypothetically 'noise-free' environment, the 'winner' has little downside to holding out-she gets the same expectancy, either through actual performance if the loser sticks it out, through contract damages if the winner wins on the breach question, and through a deduction of that same expectation amount from the loser's damages if she loses on the breach question. If the contract breaks down and a dispute ensues, it will be relatively easy (less costly) to resolve since nothing would depend on who breached first. This is consistent with the view that the contract defines all obligations at the point of contract formation and that post-formation flexibility is either beside the point or undesirable. Professor Henry
Mather advanced this view based not on economic analysis (which he viewed as inconclusive) but on a libertarian idea that the law should strive towards minimal coercion and that liability should follow only from consent.
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R3RUE's new 'contract rate rule', a hybrid of the two extremes, would at first blush seem to lie somewhere between the two in its tendency to promote a contract adjustment, since it ultimately produces a sliding scale of economic incentive. Like the 'reasonable value rule', its operation, too, depends on who is ultimately identified as the 'first material breacher'. If the loser is the breacher, the economic result is the same as it 37 Mather, 'Restitution as a Remedy' (n 15) 30.
is under the Restatement of Contracts: reliance damages minus the victim-winner's full expectation under the contract. 38 But if the winner is the breacher, the rule is more complicated than the traditional rule. Under the 'contract rate rule', the winner would secure a fraction of her profit (that part represented by the percentage of the contract that is complete) if she were found to be the breacher. 39 So, while material breach continues to be central to triggering that rule, the stakes that ride on the question become smaller the further along the contract proceeds in performance.
If the contract is 90 per cent complete at the time it breaks down, for example, the winner will recover 90 per cent of her expectancy if she is found to be the breacher and 100 per cent if the loser has breached. This gives the winning owner less economic reason to agree to a price adjustment the further along in performance the contract is. The tendency of the new R3RUE rule to motivate consensual modification depends on the performance progress of each contract under consideration.
The 'reasonable value rule' also produces a sliding scale of economic motivation but in the opposite direction: as the losing contract progresses, the gap between the winner's expectation recovery and the loser's 'reasonable value' recovery widens. If the size of the gap motivates action, then there is more motivation as the contract progresses towards full completion than there is at the start of the contract. This could supply more motivation for strategic action, 40 or, as developed in the text, more motivation to adjust the contract rather than face the uncertainties of a breakdown followed by a dispute resolution process. Which incentives a given rule actually supplies to real people in these settings is ultimately an empirical question that, given the 'noise' of the situation, is not likely to be resolvable. This, of course, contributes substantial uncertainty to the rule's application.
The new approach has undoubtedly added complexity to the analysis (in a real dispute, would the parties ever fail to contest what portion of the total work was actually completed?); if projected uncertainty in dispute resolution will motivate a contract adjustment to keep the contract together, the R3RUE approach might, ironically, supply the best motivation of all the rules.
It should be obvious that a rational actor analysis is highly indeterminate in this setting, not only because of the complexity of the relational contexts in which the parties will likely find themselves but also because the rational actor analysis itself depends on initial speculation about how people will actually behave in a given environment.
Rational actor analysis of the kind described here typically assumes a rigorously self-40 See Kull, 'Rescission and Restitution' (n 19) 1472.
interested actor on whom economic incentives alone operate in a context-free environment. As suggested above, one can imagine a rational actor behaving in different ways in response to economic stimuli and, of course, the behaviour selected can control the ensuing analysis. The alternate rational actor just imagined responds to economic stimulation with co-operation rather than entirely self-interested strategizing.
B. Adding Empirical Observations to an Instrumental Analysis
Is there any support beyond pure intuition for recasting the rational actor in the way just described? Following Macaulay, one might ask: 'What would contracting parties actually do in this relational contract environment?'
We might be helped in this inquiry by behavioural economics, the discipline within the broad empirical tradition that Macaulay championed over 50 years ago that seeks answers to just these sorts of behavioural questions. Many studies conducted by these scholars have established that human beings do not respond to economic stimuli in the way an exclusive focus on self-interest (indeterminate as that focus may be) might suggest.
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The older behavioural scholarship has attacked traditional economic analysis in its most basic assumptions. Shown either to be wrong or to be sufficiently inaccurate as to 41 It would be great overstatement to suggest that the new research has done much to dampen the continued The reciprocity theory holds that individuals in collective action settings behave not like rational wealth maximizers but rather like moral and emotional reciprocators. When they perceive that other individuals are voluntarily contributing to public goods, most individuals are moved by honor, generosity, and like dispositions to do the same. When, in contrast, they perceive that others are shirking or otherwise taking advantage of them, individuals are moved by resentment and pride to withhold their own contributions and even to retaliate if possible. The reciprocity theory implies that because individuals behave in this fashion, the most effective means to promote cooperative behavior in collective action settings is to promote trust-the shared belief that others can in fact be counted on to contribute their fair share to public goods, whether or not doing so is in their material self-interest. Indeed, the reciprocity theory warns that incentives can often backfire by implying that most individuals are not inclined to contribute to collective goods voluntarily.
This observation is closely related to Robert Axelrod's experiments showing that a 'tit for tat' strategy that began with co-operation was the most successful and 'profitable' strategy for addressing the prisoner's dilemma over the long run. The reciprocity norm, at its core, is relational and co-operative rather than individualist and self-interested. the proposition that our loser, when faced with performing a losing contract, would actually begin with an effort to negotiate, rather than with behaviour that was less relational and more self-centered and strategic. It might also support the proposition that, rather than rebuff such an encounter, the winner might well-and should-entertain it.
Indeed, Axelrod's findings on player strategies for addressing the iterated prisoner's dilemma, 53 suggests that this contractor's strategy-initial co-operation rather than 'defection' in addressing the pricing within the contact-and the owner's co-operation, is also the most effective in the long run. Researchers-even those working at the hypothetical level without rich factual context-who began with this different set of initial moves could understand the instrumental dynamics differently and, perhaps, begin a normative analysis that resonates better with observed contracting behaviour.
But while different initial assumptions might lead to different normative prescriptions, a main point of the foregoing discussion was to suggest that any prescriptive instrumental analysis of the incentives that might operate within a relational contract is fraught with problems. In the relational contract context particularly, it is very unlikely that instrumental analysis (whatever its initial assumptions about human behaviour) can point to any reliable policy prescriptions, even if one agreed that the goal was simply to produce an 'efficient' rule. 
III. The Ideological Context for the New Rule
While the reciprocity norm has enormous implications for contract theory, the complexity of a relational contract context makes an instrumental analysis that emphasizes the reciprocity norm subject to the same criticism as an instrumental analysis that emphasizes purely self-interested behaviour. The result of such inconclusiveness would suggest deference to the status quo in most instances.
In this Section we consider the losing contract problem from a different 56 This same 'system separation' animated attacks on the tort of interference with contract which in many respects, it was contended, was inconsistent with the teaching of 'efficient breach'. Ultimately those attacks, too, conceived of contract law as separate and 'dominant', but this time over tort law. The attacks are
R3RUE § 2 Comment c makes this clear:
Contract is superior to restitution as a means of regulating voluntary transfers because it eliminates, or minimizes, the fundamental difficulty of valuation. Considerations of both justice and efficiency require that private transfers be made pursuant to contract whenever reasonably possible and that the parties' own definition of their respective obligations-assuming the validity of their agreement by all pertinent tests-take precedence over the obligations that the law would impose in the absence of agreement.
Restitution is accordingly subordinate to contract as an organizing principle of private relationships, and the terms of an enforceable agreement normally displace any claim of unjust enrichment within their reach.
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This means that if a situation involves an enforceable contract, then it must have a solution grounded in contract, and only in contract.
That particular conception of 'contract law' that supplies a 'contract' answer to any problem involving an enforceable contract is itself a particular one that sees the field as coextensive with 'promise' 58 or, alternatively, 'consent'. 59 Once the problem is defined as having an enforceable contractual underpinning, then liability should not go beyond the promise. Harm to the plaintiff, if it goes beyond the promisor's commitment, might be important but is subordinate to the higher principle of limiting the promisor's liability to the value of the promise. In this way, a promise may serve primarily as a limit to the individual promisor's liability rather than as a reciprocal commitment to one's contracting partner. And expectation damages, being ultimately based on the value of the promise (rather than harm done through breach), becomes a cardinal component in this vision. In the losing contract setting, giving the loser-plaintiff a remedy that exceeds the value one calculates based on the breacher's promise would, it is said, 'unjustly enrich' the plaintiff, presumably by giving the loser plaintiff more than he bargained for, 60 or exposing the promisor to more liability than she assumed. 61 This view of contract accords great respect to personal autonomy and freedom, both to make contracts and, importantly in this context, from liability not voluntarily assumed. It tends to regard contract almost solely as a mechanism to shift risk rather than as a mechanism to shift risk and accomplish something through joint effort. Reciprocity, and the context that reciprocity gives to the act of making a commitment, has relatively little to do with it.
But there is, and probably always has been, a competing normative vision of the institution of contract, one based on the relational bond formed in many contracts, empirically observed by Macaulay and scores of others. 62 In this view, once a contract is made, the contracting parties owe one another 'more' than the quantifiable measure of their respective promises. One can express that 'more' in a number of ways: the trust 60 R3RUE, § 38 cmt d. then breach should never expand that liability beyond the value we place on that promise.
Thus, promise is not an act that can, if breached, inflict harm that must be compensated but, rather, it is an assumption of limited liability. A more reciprocal view of the institution places promissory harm nearer to the centre 69 and might downgrade the breacher's original promise as having much limiting value once she has breached that promise. At least in relational contract settings, perhaps one surrenders one's right to the benefit of the bargain when one breaches that bargain.
One can get a good sense of the contrasting perspectives on the connection between breach and the original bargain in R3RUE's commentary about Bush v Canfield, 70 a well-known restitution case where the loser had made a down payment of $5,000 in a goods contract where the contract price was $14,000 and the goods turned out to be worth only $11,000. The seller breached by non-delivery and subsequently resisted the loser's claim for the $5,000 down payment, maintaining that the loser's loss on the bargain should be deducted leaving the buyer's refund claim at $2,000. The court rejected this proposition. This outcome seems very intuitive and nearly self-evident. But how one explains it can reflect powerfully the vision one has for contract law.
R3RUE would follow precedent and permit Bush to get his $5,000 back, undiminished by the consequences of his bad bargain. It does so through its remedy in Section 37 called 'rescission'. But it seems to be a grudging acceptance of this universally In theory, and on rare occasions in practice, rescission pursuant to § 37 permits a plaintiff who has paid in advance for a defaulted performance to recover an amount exceeding compensatory damages. See Illustrations 1-2 [Illustration 2 uses the essential facts of Bush v Canfield]. Such outcomes are rare, because a prepaid seller will almost never forfeit a profit that might be earned, at the seller's option, by performing the contract or simply releasing the buyer. The striking results of Illustrations 1-2 are the fortuitous consequence of the law's adherence to a simple rule rather than a complex one. The simple rule is that a plaintiff who seeks only the return of a prepaid price, or return of property in specie, will not (for reasons of both fairness and economy) be put to the burden of proving damages from the defendant's breach. There is no comparable windfall to the plaintiff if the sequence of performance is reversed because rescission is not available as a remedy for a payment default.
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Note the underlying assumptions: that expectation damages (derived from the original bargain) are compensatory; that allowing the plaintiff to recover in excess of the bargain is 'striking'; and that damages in excess of expectation are a 'windfall'.
In this vision, the contract once struck has permanently shifted the risk, survives intact, and is independent of performance; breach-and the violation of the reciprocity norm that breach may represent-has little or no role to play. Indeed, but for the administrative convenience that produced Bush v Canfield's 'striking windfall', one would imagine a policy view that would hard-wire the deal Bush and Canfield stuck and return to Bush only the $2,000 that was left after deducting his self-inflicted loss on the bargain.
One holding such a strong view of the significance of the original-but breached-bargain might also question or reject the proposition suggested earlier that, were the loser to approach the winner in the midst of performance for a concession, the best outcome would be an adjusted contract. Having played the game at contract formation, for all intents and purposes, the game is over. Having legitimately 'won' at the outset by making a good bargain, the winner should have little reason to make a concession to the loser.
Apart from the convenience of remedy, should the fact of breach itself matter in Certainly on those facts it is difficult to see the justice of allowing the seller to retain $3,000 of the amount received from the buyer, on the plea that the buyer would have lost this amount if the seller had performed a contract which in fact he did not perform. The seller gave nothing in exchange for the $3,000 except a broken promise and the principle of unjust enrichment surely is applicable. If the buyer had made no payment and had been the party who repudiated the contract, the seller could have recovered $3,000 damages for loss of his bargain. It would be curious indeed for the seller to obtain the same advantage when he is the one guilty of breach.
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Significantly, the Reporter's view, compared to Professor Palmer's, is quite different:
In reality, however, the seller 'gave' the essence of what he undertook to give: He made himself liable for flour for future delivery, at a fixed price, giving the buyer an enforceable right to any profit that might be produced by a market advance. In exchange, the seller obtained the mirror-image to the buyer's contractual position: an enforceable right to any profit produced by a market decline. Because the seller's risk was the price of the seller's potential profit, it can hardly be said that the seller, having borne the risk, is unjustly enriched if he obtains the reward. necessarily his entire reliance expenditure, the winner is protected against the unlimited and unascertainable risk that a reliance-damages-without-deduction rule would supply.
In giving strong lip service to the contract-as-liability-limit position, the thrust of the commentary to R3RUE's rules gives a primacy to contract law, 76 tends to enshrine the original bargain of the parties (and the limitations to liability that the bargain might provide), and tends to reduce the significance of breach in actually altering the economic exchange created when the parties struck their contract. The driving forces behind the new losing contract rule appear to have been instrumental analyses suggesting that the pre-existing rule was inefficient and a view of contract law that saw the breacher's promise (as quantified by the expectation damages system) as providing limitations on the liability that a breacher should shoulder for breaching a contract. Section II suggested that the instrumental effect of contract rules depends on the contractual context, that their operation as incentives in relational contract settings may range from non-existent to extremely small, and in both cases are likely drowned out by other forces. That Section also suggested that instrumental analysis in this context is, in any event, extremely malleable and critically depends on assumptions about complex human behaviour for its predictive power. Actual, empirically-based human behaviour may well be different than (or in some cases, perhaps opposite to) that assumed by those supporting a change in the traditional rule and might well support the older rule itself.
That Section concluded by suggesting that an instrumental analysis in this highlyrelational context was sufficiently inconclusive as to actually suggest support for the old rule, developed as it was by courts working in the complex contexts that are assumed away in the process of creating a normative instrumental analysis.
Section III argued that a particular vision of contract law and of its primacy over overlapping systems (here, the restitution system) may have driven the rule change, despite case law that remained essentially unchanged. This Section considers the question of whether the new rule will be embraced by the courts in the kinds of cases where it will arise. It will also briefly consider whether the new rule might have effects outside the litigation system.
The 'contract rate rule' proposed in R3RUE has been around for a very long time, is intuitively satisfying, and is probably quite well known. But nonetheless it has been 77 This was, of course, the 'contract' that Grant Gilmore declared 'dead' in G Gilmore, The Death of 38(2)(b). This 'price-cap rule' rests on the normative proposition that the winner should never be required to pay more than was explicitly agreed to in the contract.
But capping a reasonable value award by the contract price is even less true to the parties' supposed intent. Indeed, allowing reasonable value up to the contract price, while true to a policy of protecting the winner from paying more than she explicitly promised for the whole performance, may be otherwise incoherent. The big-loser plaintiff who has conferred a small part of the bargained-for benefit receives the same recovery (the contract price) as the small-loser plaintiff who has conferred a much larger part of the work. While one cannot know why an intuitively satisfying Kehoe rule was not widely embraced by the courts, one reason may be that, when faced with the complexities of litigation involving partially-performed contracts, the Kehoe rule was simply unworkable and the alternative of capping a reasonable value award with the contract price seemed an even less satisfying judicial response to the winner's breach of contract than the traditional, uncapped, alternative.
While the inertia of the past (and precedent) might suggest that modern courts, too, might reject the new rule, it is hazardous to project twenty-first century judicial receptivity from twentieth-century decisions. Section 38 will give modern courts some secondary authority to cap a recovery at the contract price, though the main explanation for the rule is the far more satisfying (to some) contract-rate rule. And while the price-cap outcome is (perhaps) the least coherent approach when measured against likely party intent, it may be appealing to courts who would view contract as a liability-limiting device. Our courts are also a product of our modern times and might well be more receptive to a contract-as-promise view of the situation than were earlier courts that considered expectation damages as simply one of many ways the legal system might legitimately respond to a breach of contract.
What about the effects of the new rule those who perform contracts? It seems extremely unlikely that the parties to the kinds of contracts involved here will know of the new rule, at least until the first case is litigated and the new rule implemented within it.
But even if they were to know of the new rule, and even if the new rule's incentive effects (whatever they may be) were not overwhelmed by the other motivational forces operating in the context of these complex contracts, the parties' strategic decision-making within their contract has actually been further complicated by the new rule. As before, it will be extraordinarily difficult for the parties to an ongoing relational contract to predict who the court will hold to be the first material breacher (and under the new rule, it will still matter). With the announced new rule, it will also be very difficult to predict which rule ('reasonable value rule', 'price-capped rule', or 'contract rate rule') the court will use once it decides the material breach question. The added uncertainty may have the paradoxical effect of keeping relational contracts together by making what will happen if either party withdraws even more unpredictable. 89 While it would not be a welcome conclusion for those who laboured hard to find the 'right' solution to the losing contract problem, on this basis one might perhaps proclaim the rule 'a success'.
For the contract system more generally, 'success' will be in the eye of the beholder. Quite clearly the new rule further enshrines a particular view of contract law and, in the process, contributes to the marketing of that view. Those who already hold that view will applaud this affirmation of their view, and those now being educated will see additional evidence that it is the way to think about contract law.
But the fascination of this subject is that there always are, and always have been, more ways than one to look at it. In concluding this Section, it is worth recalling a famous passage from Grant Gilmore's The Death of Contract:
We have become used to the idea that, in literature and the arts, there are alternating rhythms of classicism and romanticism. During classical periods, which are, typically, of brief duration, everything is neat, tidy and logical; theorists and critics reign supreme; formal rules of structure and composition are stated to the general acclaim … But the classical aesthetic, once it has been formulated, regularly breaks down in a protracted romantic agony. The romantics spurn the exquisitely stated rules of the preceding period; they experiment, they improvise; they deny the existence of any rules; they churn around in an ecstasy of self-expression. At the height of a romantic period, everything is confused, sprawling, formless and chaoticas well as, frequently, extremely interesting. Then, the romantic energy having spent itself, there is a new classical reformulationand so the rhythms continue. 90 We have probably been in another 'classical period' since the 1980s, but we now have a new generation of researchers, following Macaulay's lead, who are challenging theoretical conclusions with real-world observations. There will be, no doubt, many candidates in the new generation of empirical scholars for the title 'Lord High
Executioner of the Contract is Dead Movement' that Gilmore conferred on Macaulay at the start of his book. 91 It will only be a matter of time before they work their magic.
Conclusion
Stewart Macaulay began his long career with a 1959 article that wondered whether the law of restitution could be understood without its context. From that first effort, he proceeded to a career-and helped begin a tradition-of empirical examination of the many contexts in which the law is used. His many studies might well be described as unsettling: repeatedly, they suggest that real parties in real situations do not behave as the 90 Gilmore, The Death of Contract (n 77) 111-12.
91 ibid fn 1.
'rational' people we might hope, imagine or hypothesize them to be. Reading Macaulay would make one scoptical that theory could ever accurately capture or describe a coherent picture, or that rules could have reliably predictable effects on those they aim to affect.
This examination of the losing contract rules-the traditional one found in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the new one found in the new Restatement (Third) of Restitution-extends Macaulay's call for 'context' in an effort both to better understand why the rule changed, and to predict whether it will be a successful change. It has suggested that the normative case for the new rule is, ultimately, contingent on behavioural predictions that may be false, and on an idea of contract law that is debatable and perhaps ideological. On this basis, one could argue that the proponents of change have not met their normative burden, and that the courts who have worked in the thicket of relational contracts are more likely to have got it 'right' than have the theorists.
The new complexity that the added rules contribute to predicting legal outcomes may have the effect of dampening party enthusiasm for ending their contracts and, instead, prompting them to work things out rather than resort to litigation. However one views that as an outcome, it may mean that we will not know for a long time whether the new rule will be well-received or rejected in the courts. 92 And given the cyclical nature of our views of contract law and of the expanding work of Macaulay-inspired empiricists, the 'contract law' that has been the predicate and context for the R3RUE rule may be 'dead' before we find out. 
